Beyond Just War: Military Strategy for the Common Good

The objective of this article is to move ethical discourse on military strategy beyond the confines of the established War Convention. This is achieved by utilising the common good, a concept found in political philosophy and theology. The common good acts as a positive organising concept for socio-political activity. With its focus on peace, development and the flourishing of the individual and community, the common good poses a significant challenge to strategy. This article constructs an approach to strategy that is compatible with the common good. Importantly, it does so whilst respecting the pursuit of victory as an indispensable component of strategy’s true nature. The theory presented in this article is then tested in relation to four different modes of strategy: regular war, irregular war, deterrence, and cyberwar.     

The Ethics of Cyber Attack: Pursuing Legitimate Security and the Common Good in Contemporary Conflict Scenarios

ABSTRACT

Cyber attack against Critical National Infrastructure is a developing capability in state arsenals. The onset of this new instrument in national security has implications for conflict thresholds and military ethics. To serve as a legitimate tool of policy, cyber attack must operate in accordance with moral concerns. To test the viability of cyber attack, this paper provides a new perspective on cyber ethics. Cyber attack is tested against the criteria of the common good. This involves identifying the four core components of the common good from a conflict perspective: respect for the person; social wellbeing; peace and security; and solidarity. The fate of these components is assessed in relation to the six key characteristics of cyber attack from a moral standpoint: security; the role or absence of violence; discrimination; proportionality; cyberharm; and the threshold of conflict. It is concluded that the common good must be incorporated into developing state cyber strategies.     

Maintaining systems with heterogeneous spare parts

We consider the problem of optimally maintaining a stochastically degrading, single‐unit system using heterogeneous spares of varying quality. The system's failures are unannounced; therefore, it is inspected periodically to determine its status (functioning or failed). The system continues in operation until it is either preventively or correctively maintained. The available maintenance options include perfect repair, which restores the system to an as‐good‐as‐new condition, and replacement with a randomly selected unit from the supply of heterogeneous spares. The objective is to minimize the total expected discounted maintenance costs over an infinite time horizon. We formulate the problem using a mixed observability Markov decision process (MOMDP) model in which the system's age is observable but its quality must be inferred. We show, under suitable conditions, the monotonicity of the optimal value function in the belief about the system quality and establish conditions under which finite preventive maintenance thresholds exist. A detailed computational study reveals that the optimal policy encourages exploration when the system's quality is uncertain; the policy is more exploitive when the quality is highly certain. The study also demonstrates that substantial cost savings are achieved by utilizing our MOMDP‐based method as compared to more naïve methods of accounting for heterogeneous spares.     

Systems failure: the US way of irregular warfare

ABSTRACT

Since 9/11, the United States has achieved notable gains against al Qaeda, and also Islamic State (IS), all while avoiding another mass-casualty attack at home. Yet, institutionally, culturally, and in its capabilities, the US government remains seriously ill-equipped for the task of countering irregular threats. Partly as a result, Islamist extremism shows no sign of being defeated, having instead metastasized since 9/11 and spread. Why, given the importance accorded to counterterrorism, has the US approach remained inadequate? What is impeding more fundamental reforms? The article evaluates the United States’ way of irregular warfare: its troubled engagement with counterinsurgency and its problematic search for lower cost and lower risk ways of combating terrorism. It suggests needed reforms but acknowledges also the unlikelihood of change.     

The Enfield Lock Barrel Mill of 1815 and Moves to Replace Musket Barrel Grinding by Turning c1780 to c1840

In 1841 Henry Wilkinson in his book Engines of War and William Greener in The Science of Gunnery describe a range of methods then in use for shaping the outside of gun barrels after the barrel forging process, ranging from manual off-hand grinding to the use of precision machines. In the same year G. & J. Rennie published the design of their state-of-the-art lathe that was capable of turning complex and dished barrel forms. This built upon the earlier work of both Henry Nock and John Jones. In the early years of the 19th century both Britain, at Enfield and other locations, and the USA, at Harpers Ferry and Springfield, began to introduce barrel-turning technology. This paper uses measurements taken from a significant number of military barrels made by several makers, and also newly exposed information about Henry Nock and the Enfield Factory of 1815, to understand better the technologies that were applied to military flintlock barrel finishing from the 1780s to the 1840s, and particularly during the major wars of 1793–1815, when high output was paramount. Measurements both of barrel form and out-of-roundness are presented. These allow the interpretation of the techniques being used by different makers at different locations, and raise questions about the purpose and achievement of the complex dished barrel forms found on British military flintlock muskets. This approach also allows us to better describe the earliest factory on the Enfield site, one of the most significant sites in the wider history of UK manufacturing.     

More military base closure? Considering the alternatives*

Despite multiple base closing rounds, the United States Department of Defense still has excess base capacity, and thus President Trump and high-level Defense Department officials are calling for more base closure through the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. However, another BRAC may not be the optimal solution, because simple base closure is not an efficient way to reduce surplus base capacity. Thus, Defense Department officials should consider other methods to reduce surplus capacity, including reduction in base size, leasing excess base property, or transferring it to another government agency for a variety of alternative uses. The surplus capacity issue also offers an opportunity to DOD to reassess base utilization, to update base requirements with current and future force structure. While BRAC focuses on American military bases, the process and alternatives also have international applications.